Helping Haiti: Colombia says ownership is the origin of aid effectiveness

 
 

Click on the image to go to the Acción Social site (in Spanish)

This contribution to the debate on aid ownership comes from Sandra Alzate, Director of International Cooperation, Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation – Acción Social, Colombia. You can see French and Spanish translations by clicking on the “more” tag.

I would like to express our rejection of the conclusion of Joel Brinkley in his article: “Don’t let Haitians help themselves“, according to which “if the World wants to help Haiti, aid officials should put aside the Paris Agreement on Aid Effectiveness. The donors should decide what to do with their money. The Haitian “government” can have no more than an advisory role, or nothing will ever change”.

There are several points to mention.

As expressed in the article, there have indeed been decades of unproductive work; unproductive work that gave rise to the reflections and actions for more effective aid strategies, both in countries dependent and not dependent on aid.

The Paris Declaration (PD) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) have become a commitment of the international community with the most vulnerable populations of the world. Colombia shares the principles of the PD because it locates the responsibility for development with the so-called partner countries, and because it understands international cooperation as complementary to national efforts.

In particular, the principle of “ownership” is seen by Colombia as the origin of the aid effectiveness chain, and necessary in order to strengthen leadership, coordination, dialogue and interaction between all the development actors, thus enriching their cooperation policies and practices.

It is in this scenario that Colombia has played an active role in the international debate. This has generated new spaces of dialogue and has promoted the incorporation of the effectiveness agenda, and of subjects like broadening and the  democratization of the term ownership, the promotion of using national systems and mutual evaluation mechanisms, the recognition of the role of NGOs, the reference to south-south and triangular cooperation policies, and aid information transparency.

As anticipated in the PD and AAA, donors have the responsibility to develop capacities and leadership in Southern countries so as to support the sustainable construction of their own development. Nevertheless, traditional cooperation models in Haiti have reflected a lack of work from donors related to this responsibility (lack of capacity-building, creation of dependence, fragmentation of initiatives, high transaction costs, weakness of accountability, and lack of transparency).

Considering these factors, ownership becomes the common denominator that must govern in a vulnerable and, for decades, criticized context like the one in which Haiti has been living. This principle allows the exercise of an effective authority of development policies and strategies where donors respect the leadership and they contribute to local capacities development and strength.

To imagine a scenario like the one raised in the conclusion by Brinkley, where the Haitian reality reflects the presence of multiple international actors working to develop the country, without guaranteeing a firm leadership and an active participation of the Haitian government, only generates a lack of organization of the numerous cooperation actions, and a negative impact for the future generations of Haitian society.

Colombia, as a Middle Income Country, positioned as a donor of financial and technical cooperation in Haiti, has felt deep solidarity with the Haitian Government since the earthquake of January 12, 2010. As a result, Colombia participates as an observer in the Interim Recovery Haiti Commission (IHRC) and is using the Haiti Reconstruction Fund – created by the Government of Haiti and managed by the World Bank – to realize, as a request of the Government, a donation of $4 million for budget support to the agricultural and land reconstruction sectors.

Colombia has also seen in South-South Cooperation an opportunity to promote in Haiti a new philosophy that encourages an integrated and new approach to development, based on a coordination scheme between all the actors involved, connecting the emergency and recovery stage, and guaranteeing the active participation of local communities in decision-making.

What the author proposes in his article is not new, but is a scenario that has caused a continued chaotic situation in Haiti. It is for that reason that we would like to invite the author to reframe his ideas and to better ask donors what they have done, or what they are doing, to develop Haiti’s capacity for leadership. (more…)

Helping Haiti: Moving beyond the blame game

 

Click on the image for links to government and state institutions

Following the previous post on aid to Haiti, Jerzy POMIANOWSKI, Director of the OECD’s Partnership for Democratic Governance Advisory Unit and Bathylle MISSIKA, Technical Advisor for the OECD-PDG sent us this contribution to the debate. You can find information on PDG work on Haiti’s reconstruction and development here.

Brinkley is absolutely right when he underlines some of the shortcomings of donor involvement in Haiti. The “by the book” application of some of the pivotal Paris Declaration principles  of ownership or use of country systems (“alignment”) has not delivered according to plan. But should we expect the same pace of improvement from “good performers” like Tanzania or Ghana in countries like Haiti, which are emerging from decades of political and social instability and rampant poverty?

As outlined in the DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, donors need to adapt their strategies to fragile contexts. In other words, discarding the ownership principle altogether is not the answer and certainly sounds schizophrenic after the political and financial commitments made by aid donors in March at the international conference in New York when more than USD 5 billion was pledged to help Haiti “build back better”.

Clearly, this money cannot be given in the form of a blank check. Brinkley is also right to warn against the misuse of funds and the risks of seeing monies disappear in the wrong pockets. This does not mean that donors should “decide what to do with their money”. A countless number of evaluations have showed that “ring fencing” funds by creating isolated projects run by donors using their own procedures and staff, and accountable only to themselves only leads to greater alienation of the government, a lack of efficiency and unsustainable results. Haitian stewardship is not incompatible with safeguarding mechanisms.

The Reconstruction Commission mentioned by Brinkley, which approves all new development and reconstruction projects, has been established with a built-in, independent “Performance and Anti-corruption Office” with a compliance unit and investigative powers so as to limit the risks of embezzlement in reconstruction projects.

Moreover, Brinkley is wrong in asserting that Haitian leadership has led nowhere in the past. It is precisely the past practice of aid donors avoiding the state that needs to be let go. Since former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier fled the island in 1986, donors have unfortunately often bypassed the government. But Haitian ownership has manifested itself in many ways. It now needs the right stepping stone to take off.

The most recent example cited by Brinkley of displaced people on the Champ de Mars is a good example. Whatever the Government (or in this case, President Préval) puts forth as its own agenda, some international critics raise eyebrows because things should be done by the (their?) book. Should tents have been left in front of the destroyed Presidential Palace, fingers would have been pointed at the Haitian government for its inertia.

The biggest risk now is not to avoid having “Haitians help themselves” but, rather, a return to the sub-optimal pre-earthquake model, in which donors, NGOs and other non-state providers bypassed the state, with 85% of essential services such as health, education or water primarily administered and delivered through NGOs, private companies and other non-state actors such as charities, associations and faith-based groups, with little accountability to the government or the beneficiaries of these services.

As discussed during a workshop organised from 8-9 July 2010 by the Haitian government in collaboration with the OECD’s Partnership for Democratic Governance, the Govern­ment of Haiti, donors and service providers have laid the ground for a new approach to the delivery of basic social services. “We need to redefine the model that prevailed before the earthquake, in particular to allow Haitians to have access to the essential services [they] can rightfully expect from the State,” Prime Minister Bellerive said as he opened discussions at the July workshop.

This new paradigm for service delivery, in which all stakeholders accept the Haitian state’s primary stewardship role and, at a minimum, its core policy-making, standard-setting and monitoring roles, can mark a turning point in what has so far been an uncoordinated tango between donors, NGOs and the government.

This uneven relationship of mistrust and low mutual accountability probably stems from Haiti’s complicated history as the first black republic, which freed itself from slavery and declared independence in 1804, while reinstating a culture of dependency through dictatorships, the oppression of the elite and a reliance on foreign aid.

Now is actually the time to allow Haitians to help themselves. Finger-pointing has not led anywhere and it is high time for donors and the Haitians to “walk the talk”. The new rules of engagement discussed in July are premised on the Government setting its policy orientations, being informed of the activities of all donors and non-state providers, and applying its norms and regulations, while being able to decide what services should be delivered and where. This is the least that citizens can expect from their sovereign state and the first step towards greater accountability.

This approach of enhanced transparency was behind the creation of the IHRC, which is not co-chaired by President Préval as incorrectly stated by Brinkley, but by Prime Minister Bellerive. The Commission has become an easy scapegoat, while it is simply the tip of the iceberg of a bigger problem: Donors tend to supply technical responses to political problems and apply old recipes, such as hiring big management consulting firms to set up multi-donor funds and expecting donors to fall in line behind their approach.

Brinkley rightly notes that the Commission has “met only once” and implies it is far from being operational, but this situation has more to do with all the weaknesses of international recruitment systems and the superimposition of donors’ own red tape and pre-defined organigrams than anything else.

The Commission is about to meet a second time on 17 August and is certainly behind schedule. But before resuming the never-ending ‘blame game’ it should be given the space and time to operate. If donors do not support Haitians to help themselves according to a set of mutually agreed new rules of engagement and through the mechanisms that they themselves have helped to create, it would be, as a popular Creole proverb goes, like “lave men siye a tè” (washing your hands then rubbing them in the dirt). 

Useful links (the previous post on this topic also has many links)

 

Atelier sur le renforcement des capacités du Gouvernement haïtien : Provision et coordination des services sociaux de base (8-9 juillet 2010)

 

Plateforme pour la refondation d’Haïti

 

BetterAid unites over 700 development organisations from civil society working on development effectiveness and “is leading many of the civil society activities” in the lead up to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in Busan, Korea in 2011

 

Inter-American Development Bank on Haiti