A corporate right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination?
Stijn Lamberigts, PhD researcher at the University of Luxembourg and junior affiliated researcher at the Institute of Criminal Law of the KU Leuven. These comments are a contribution to a public consultation on foreign bribery and the liability of legal persons by the OECD Working Group on Bribery.
Corporations in general, and multinationals in particular, wield substantial financial and socio-economic power. They can and do commit different types of offences through the individuals that work for them. Faced with this reality, the use of corporate criminal liability (CCL) has increased over time. However, CCL raises many theoretical and practical questions. To what extent can corporations be held criminally liable for offences requiring a mens rea element? How should criminal proceedings be conducted against corporations? Who will represent the corporation throughout an investigation or trial? To what extent do corporations benefit from procedural safeguards that were historically conceived for individuals?
These questions have been answered differently around the world. Some systems base CCL on a model of vicarious liability, whereas others favour an anthropomorphic model. Procedural questions, such as those above, on how corporations should be tried and how fair trial rights should apply to corporations, are often overlooked.
Whereas the applicability of some fair trial rights to corporations may be easily accepted, other rights such as the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, are less obvious when corporations are suspected of a criminal offence. These rights were traditionally developed to protect individuals against physical or psychological compulsion. If they are to be applied in the corporate context, several questions arise, such as: which of the corporation’s employees can invoke these rights? All employees? Only middle or top management? Only the corporation’s legal representatives? What would be the impact if corporations could rely on the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to hand over self-incriminating documents?
The (un)availability of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence can substantially impact defence strategies available to corporations. If they cannot rely on these rights when confronted with a demand for incriminating evidence by prosecuting authorities, the choices available to corporations are limited. Corporations can have good reasons for deciding to cooperate with prosecuting authorities in an effort to obtain the most favourable outcome, for example because they want to avoid the stigma that can come with criminal conviction. Then, they are likely to cooperate, for example by handing over evidence of any wrongdoing. Conversely, a corporation may decide that it does not want to cooperate with the prosecuting authorities. In such cases, the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination are particularly relevant.
The question about whether a corporation can rely on the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence has been answered differently in different jurisdictions. The variety of approaches can be particularly challenging in the context of cross-border corporate wrongdoing, such as bribery of foreign public officials.
The US approach is very clear: corporations, like other collective entities, cannot benefit from self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. This Supreme Court doctrine can be traced back to Hale v Henkel handed down at the beginning of the 20th century and the cases that further developed the doctrine. The exclusion of corporations from the scope of these rights was based on several arguments, some of which have lost their appeal over time. The Supreme Court considered that, as the privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal privilege, it cannot be exercised by corporate employees or agents on the corporation’s behalf as it feared the detrimental impact on the prosecution of cases in a business context. Nevertheless, the US Supreme Court has accepted that corporations can benefit from several other fundamental rights.
The Belgian Court of Cassation’s approach is at the other end of the spectrum. It was confronted with a case in which a financial institution had been required to produce self-incriminating evidence and failure to do so could result in a fine. The Court of Appeal had excluded evidence that was produced under that threat as it considered that the right to silence had been infringed. Its judgment was confirmed by the Court of Cassation on 19 June 2013 (Case P.12.1150.F).
The European Court of Human Rights, which has handed down several cases dealing with the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination in the context of natural persons, gives no detailed answer to the aforementioned question.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has ruled on the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination of undertakings in the context of competition law. It should be stressed that EU competition law is not considered to be criminal in nature by the CJEU. Thus, it may be that the CJEU would be more generous when corporations face classic criminal sanctions instead of punitive administrative sanctions. The Court’s position can be summarized as follows: undertakings cannot refuse to hand over incriminating documents when the European Commission issues a Decision based on Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, nor can they refuse to answer its questions, except where answering a question would entail an admission of an infringement of competition law.
The recently adopted EU Directive 2016/343, which includes a provision on the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, excludes legal persons from its scope. The Preamble to the Directive makes it clear that legal persons can nevertheless rely on existing legislative safeguards and case law.
In conclusion, several uncertainties have been highlighted. Whether and how procedural safeguards are to be applied when a corporation is being prosecuted, is a complex question, which has been answered differently by various countries. The wide variety of approaches taken in Europe and elsewhere highlight some of the challenges in the field.